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CASTING STONES: THE ROLE OF FAULT IN VIRGINIA
DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS
Donald K. Butler*
Marilyn D. Russell**
The national trend is toward eliminating fault as a factor in
many aspects of divorce,1 and in some states it plays virtually no
role at all.2 However, Virginia is among those few remaining states
where fault is potentially involved in every aspect of a divorce
case.
3
Although fault grounds for divorce have been entirely eliminated
in some states in favor of no-fault grounds or some euphemistic
grounds such as "irretrievable breakdown," "irreconcilable differ-
ences," or "incompatibility, ' 4 fault grounds for divorce still exist in
* B.A., 1966, University of Richmond; J.D., 1970, T.C. Williams School of Law, Univer-
sity of Richmond. Mr. Butler practices family law in Richmond, Virginia, and is a member
of the Board of Governors of the Family Law Section of the Virginia State Bar.
** B.A., 1983, University of California at Davis; J.D., 1986, T.C. Williams School of Law,
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1. Freed & Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 18 FAM. L.Q. 369 (1985)
(nationwide family law survey as of August 1984). Many states have eliminated fault as a
factor in various aspects of divorce in the last ten years. See generally 1985 Survey of Amer-
ican Family Law, 11 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3015 (May 7, 1985) [hereinafter cited as 1985
Survey].
2. Seventeen states expressly or impliedly exclude marital fault from consideration in
awarding alimony, maintenance or property distribution. Freed & Walker, supra note 1, at
394-95. Those states are: California, Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Tennessee, Washington, West
Virginia (excluded for property settlement, but not alimony), Wisconsin, and the Virgin
Islands. Id.
3. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91 (Repl. Vol. 1983) (grounds for divorce from bond of matri-
mony); id. § 20-95 (grounds for divorce from bed and board); id. § 20-107.1 (Cum. Supp.
1985) (spousal support); id. § 20-107.2 (child custody and support); id. § 20-107.3 (equitable
distribution of marital property).
4. In several states, irretrievable breakdown of the marriage or irreconcilable differences,
and mental incompetence are the sole grounds for divorce. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-
312 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1985); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4506 (West 1976); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-
106 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.052 (West 1985); HAwAII REv. STAT. § 580-42 (Repl. Vol.
1976); IowA CODE ANN. § 598.17 (West 1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.170 (Baldwin 1983);
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.6 (West Curn. Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518-06 (West
Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.305 (Vernon 1977); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-104 (1985);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-347 (1984); OI. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.025 (1983); REV. CODE WASH.
ANN. § 26.09.030 (Supp. 1986); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-104 (1977).
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Virginia.5 Those grounds are adultery, cruelty, wilful desertion or
abandonment, reasonable apprehension of bodily hurt, sodomy or
buggery outside of the marriage, and conviction of a felony which
results in confinement for more than one year.6 Virginia law also
provides for a no-fault divorce which is based upon a required pe-
riod of separation without cohabitation.7
Consequently, fault often is an issue in a Virginia divorce pro-
ceeding because it can materially affect the court's disposition of
financial and custody issues in the case. First, the existence of fault
is an absolute bar to entitlement to spousal support.8 Second, fault
is a statutory factor to be considered in the equitable distribution
of marital property. 9 Last, certain circumstances of fault can affect
the outcome of a child custody case. 10
The consideration of fault in these aspects of a divorce creates
numerous problems for the courts and the parties involved. Such
problems include the avoidance of harsh and unfair results which
5. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(9)(a) (Repl. Vol. 1983).
6. Id. § 20-91 (grounds for divorce from bond of matrimony); id. § 20-95 (grounds for
divorce from bed and board).
7. The Virginia statute provides that divorce may be granted when the parties have been
separated for one year, or for six months when the parties have no minor children and have
entered into a separation agreement. Id. § 20-91(9)(a). The longest period of separation re-
quired by any state allowing no-fault divorce is five years. See IDAHO CODE § 32-610 (1983).
The shortest period is six months. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 551 (1974); see also
1985 Survey, supra note 1, at 3016.
8. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1 (Cum. Supp. 1985) provides that "no permanent mainte-
nance and support shall be awarded from a spouse if there exists in such spouse's favor a
ground for divorce under any provision of § 20-91(1), (3) or (6) or § 20-95." See infra notes
11-60 and accompanying text.
9. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(E) (Cum. Supp. 1985) provides that the amount of an equita-
ble distribution award shall be determined by the court after consideration of eleven factors,
including: "The circumstances and factors which contributed to the dissolution of the mar-
riage, specifically including any ground for divorce under the provisions of § 20-91(1), (3) or
(6) or § 20-95 ...." See infra notes 51-63 and accompanying text.
10. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.2 (Cum. Supp. 1985); see, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 218 Va. 196,
237 S.E.2d 89 (1977) (custody awarded to father who charged mother with adultery and
proved she was illicitly cohabiting with a man while the child was in the home). But see
Moore v. Moore, 212 Va. 153, 183 S.E.2d 172 (1971). In this case, the Virginia Supreme
Court reversed the lower court's award of custody to the father where he had charged the
mother with adultery and having an affair with a minister. Not finding sufficient evidence to
prove adultery, the court observed that "[wihile [the mother's] relationship with [the minis-
ter] was improper, it does not follow that she is not a good mother or that the children
would be subjected to an immoral influence if [the mother] should marry [the minister]."
Id. at 155, 183 S.E.2d at 174.
For an examination of Virginia's child support statute, see Comment, Allocating the
Fruits of a Marriage: A Look at Virginia's New Domestic Relations Statute, 17 U. RICH. L.
REv. 347, 358-63 (1983).
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would bar spousal support based on marital fault and the uncer-
tain role of fault in the equitable distribution of marital property.
Whether Virginia should follow the trend in other states toward
eliminating fault in some or all aspects of a divorce proceeding is a
matter of public policy, as legislated by the Virginia General As-
sembly and interpreted by the courts.
This article examines the role of fault in spousal support and
equitable distribution of marital property. It will discuss cases in
which the court has appeared constrained to interpret the law so as
to avoid barring spousal support. Concerning equitable distribu-
tion, the article will examine the role of fault under other states'
statutes and its uncertain role under the Virginia statute. Finally,
this article will suggest that many of the problems concerning the
role of fault in spousal support awards and equitable distribution
could be eliminated by the enactment of statutes that would
merely clarify the role of fault in Virginia's marital law. If the leg-
islative body is willing to go further, it could also eliminate some
inequities in the present law of divorce, and some of those possible
reforms are suggested here as well.
I. FAULT AS A BAR TO CLAIMS FOR SPOUSAL SUPPORT
Virginia Code section 20-107.1 provides that "no permanent
maintenance or support shall be awarded from a spouse if there
exists in such spouse's favor a ground of divorce."'1 This provision
places Virginia in a small minority of jurisdictions in which fault is
a complete bar to a claim for spousal support 2 and is the reason
that many divorces are so hotly contested. It also has resulted in
some curious case law, in which the courts seem constrained to find
a way to avoid the inequities that can result from this statute, par-
11. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1 (Cum. Supp. 1985).
12. In only seven of seventeen jurisdictions that include fault as a factor is some type of
marital fault an outright bar to alimony or spousal support. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-1 (1982)
(adultery and desertion); IDAHO CODE § 32-705 (1983) (rehabilitative maintenance for inno-
cent spouse only); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 160 (West 1952 & Supp. 1985) (adultery); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 50-16.6 (Repl. Vol. 1984) (adultery); PR. LAws ANN. tit. 31, § 385 (1967) (ali-
mony for innocent spouse only); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-130 (1976) (adultery); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-107.1 (Cum. Supp. 1985) (all fault grounds regardless of ground on which divorce
granted).
In Virginia, marital fault may extinguish a spousal support claim even if it occurs after
the parties have separated. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 210 Va. 44, 168 S.E.2d 251
(1969) (allowing amendment of husband's original bill to allege wife's adultery committed
after filing of original bill).
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ticularly in cases involving charges of desertion"3 and adultery14 as
fault grounds barring spousal support.
A. Justification as a Defense to a Charge of Desertion"5
Perhaps out of concern for the harsh results of allowing fault to
bar a claim for spousal support, the appellate courts of Virginia
over the years have tempered the rule defining what constitutes
justification for breaking off matrimonial cohabitation sufficient to
defeat a charge of desertion. 6 The result is that a dependent
spouse17 still may be eligible for spousal support even if he or she
cannot establish that statutory grounds for divorce existed in his
or her favor at the time of departure from the marital abode.
The Virginia Supreme Court's concern with the forfeiture of
spousal support was made evident in Graham v. Graham,'" where
the court stated: "To grant [the husband] a divorce we would have
to find that [the wife] deserted her husband without justification
and thereby forfeited her right to all maintenance or support from
him. We cannot so find from the record before us."' 9 The court in
Graham avoided finding the wife guilty of desertion without find-
ing that she had grounds for divorce against her husband. This was
11
13. See infra notes 15-51 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
15. "Desertion is a breach of matrimonial duty, and is composed first, of the actual break-
ing off of the matrimonial cohabitation, and secondly, an intent to desert in the mind of the
offender. Both must combine to make the desertion complete." Nash v. Nash, 200 Va. 890,
893, 108 S.E.2d 350, 352 (1959) (quoting Bailey v. Bailey, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 43, 47 (1871)
and Miller v. Miller, 196 Va. 698, 700, 85 S.E.2d 221, 222 (1955)).
16. See, e.g., Breschel v. Breschel, 221 Va. 208, 269 S.E.2d 363 (1980) (wife not entitled to
divorce for constructive desertion, but was justified in leaving marital abode where she rea-
sonably believed her life was in danger); Capps v. Capps, 216 Va. 382, 219 S.E.2d 898 (1975)
(isolated incident of physical violence did not entitle wife to divorce for cruelty, but justified
her departure from marital home); Rowand v. Rowand, 215 Va. 344, 210 S.E.2d 149 (1974)
(husband's demand to "get out" did not constitute constructive desertion, but justified
wife's departure from marital home); Brawand v. Brawand, 2 Va. App. -, 2 V.L.R. 935
(1986) (wife not entitled to fault divorce but was justified in leaving "a failed marriage").
But see Rexrode v. Rexrode, 2 Va. App. -, 2 V.L.R. 1143 (1986) (husband's extreme rude-
ness towards wife and her relatives did not entitle wife to divorce on ground of cruelty, nor
did it justify her departure from marital home); D'Auria v. D'Auria, 2 Va. App. -, 2 V.L.R.
1211 (1986) (Because wife's physical problems were caused by anxiety about divorce and not
husband's behavior, departure constituted desertion, rather than justified departure.).
17. At this juncture in our social history, the wife is usually the dependent spouse. There-
fore, for the sake of verbal economy, the "dependent spouse" will sometimes be referred to
in the feminine gender in this article.
18. 210 Va. 608, 172 S.E.2d 724 (1970).
19. Id. at 616, 172 S.E.2d at 730.
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accomplished by the way the court framed the question and an-
swered it:
We are therefore confronted with a narrow issue of fact: Are the
admissions of [the husband] alone, or taken with the evidence of
[the wife], sufficient to show legal justification for her desertion of
him? In making this determination, it is proper that we consider his
admissions. While no divorce may be granted on the uncorroborated
testimony of the parties or either of them, and the cause shall be
heard independently of the admissions of either party,. . . such tes-
timony and admissions are admissible and competent as evidence to
defeat a prayer for divorce.2"
Without specifically stating what grounds for divorce the wife
had established, observing only that "[t]he misconduct of [the hus-
band] was serious," '21 the court found that the wife was justified in
leaving. She therefore was not guilty of desertion, and her entitle-
ment to spousal support was preserved.22
Virginia case law has gradually liberalized the requirements of
establishing justification as a defense to a charge of desertion. The
justification issue usually arises when the dependent spouse, in
most cases the wife, leaves the marital home and the other spouse
then seeks a divorce on the ground of desertion. If the party seek-
ing the divorce succeeds in proving this ground, he is freed of the
obligation to support the dependent spouse.23
At one time, case law required the wife to establish justification
for breaking off matrimonial cohabitation by establishing that
grounds for divorce existed in her favor at the time she left the
marriage.24 She would file a cross-bill, alleging such grounds as cru-
elty, reasonable apprehension of bodily hurt, or adultery. If she
was successful in proving her cross-claims, her departure was
deemed to be justified and therefore was not considered deser-
20. Id. at 610, 172 S.E.2d at 726 (citing Cralle v. Cralle, 79 Va. 182 (1884); Bailey v.
Bailey, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 43 (1871); Tillis v. Tillis, 55 W. Va. 198, 46 S.E. 926 (1904)).
21. 210 Va. at 616, 172 S.E.2d at 730.
22. The court found that neither party was entitled to a divorce upon the evidence ad-
duced at trial. Id.
23. Pursuant to VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1 (Repl. Vol. 1983 & Cum. Supp. 1985), the court
may award spousal support to either party. However, neither party to a divorce has an auto-
matic obligation to support the other. Bristow v. Bristow, 221 Va. 1, 267 S.E.2d 89 (1980).
24. Hoback v. Hoback, 208 Va. 432, 435-36, 158 S.E.2d 113, 116 (1967); Wimbrow v. Wim-
brow, 208 Va. 141, 143-44, 156 S.E.2d 598, 601 (1967); Lawyer v. Lawyer, 207 Va. 260, 264,
148 S.E.2d 816, 819 (1966).
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tion.25 Further, because the wife was forced into the separation by
the husband's actions, the separation was his fault; her leaving was
construed as his act of desertion. Therefore, in addition to the
grounds for divorce that she proved as justification for leaving, the
wife also would be entitled to divorce on the ground of construc-
tive desertion.26
The Supreme Court of Virginia began retreating from this prece-
dent, however, in a series of cases in which it found that certain
circumstances amounted to justification for breaking off matrimo-
nial cohabitation, but did not amount to independent grounds for
divorce. In Rowand v. Rowand, the court held that the husband's
demand that the wife "get out" did not amount to constructive
desertion, a ground for divorce, but was sufficient justification for
her to leave without being guilty of desertion.28 Therefore, she was
not barred from obtaining spousal support.29
The next year, in Capps v. Capps,30 the court held that an iso-
lated incident of physical violence did not constitute cruelty enti-
tling the physically assaulted wife to divorce on that ground, but
was justification for her departure. In that case, the husband had
slapped the wife during an argument. Immediately afterwards, she
left the marital home, and Mr. Capps filed suit for divorce on the
ground of desertion. In her answer and cross-bill, Mrs. Capps
asked for a divorce on the ground of cruelty, based on the single
assault. 1 Noting its previous ruling in Rowand, the court reasoned
that, while Mrs. Capps had failed to establish a ground for divorce,
it did not necessarily follow that the husband was entitled to a
divorce on the ground of desertion:
Here the wife proved, by corroborated testimony, that her husband
physically abused her and that this conduct was the provoking cause
for her leaving the marital abode. Under these circumstances, we
find that the husband's conduct did not entitle him to a divorce on
the ground of wilful desertion since the wife left the home without
legal fault. Therefore the husband's prayer for a divorce was prop-
25. See, e.g., Wimbrow, 208 Va. 141, 156 S.E.2d 598 (wife justified in leaving and not
guilty of desertion where husband was guilty of cruelty in severely beating wife).
26. See, e.g., Rowand, 215 Va. 344, 210 S.E. 2d 149.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 346, 210 S.E.2d at 150.
29. Id. at 346, 210 S.E.2d at 151.
30. 216 Va. 382, 219 S.E.2d 898 (1975).
31. Id. at 383-84, 219 S.E.2d at 899.
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erly denied by the chancellor. 2
In a recent Virginia Supreme Court case, Breschel v. Breschel,"3
the wife was suffering from a serious debilitating disease, and her
husband had a disrespectful and disobedient son living in the mar-
ital home.3 4 The wife established that her stepson's presence and
conduct in the home was a threat to her health and that her hus-
band would neither discipline the child nor have him removed
from the home as she had requested.3 5 Based upon these circum-
stances, the wife asserted that she had been forced to leave the
marital home to preserve her own health and safety. 6 Reversing
the lower court's award of a divorce to the husband on the ground
of desertion, the supreme court found that the wife was free from
legal fault in leaving her husband where she reasonably believed
her health was endangered by remaining in the household and had
unsuccessfully taken reasonable measures to eliminate the danger
without breaking off cohabitation.3 7 The court reversed and re-
manded the case to the lower court to award spousal support.3 8
The Court of Appeals of Virginia39 has gleaned a general rule
from these three supreme court cases. In the recent case of Bra-
wand v. Brawand,0 the court stated:
The holdings in Rowand, Capps and Breschel turn on the peculiar
facts of those cases. Taken together they stand for the general pro-
position that if a wife leaves the marital abode for a cause other
than to intentionally desert her husband, and the proof of such
cause falls short of constituting constructive desertion on the hus-
32. Id. at 385, 219 S.E.2d at 900-01.
33. 221 Va. 208, 269 S.E.2d 363 (1980).
34. Id. at 209-10, 269 S.E.2d at 364-65.
35. Id. at 211, 269 S.E.2d at 365.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 212, 269 S.E.2d at 366. But see D'Auria, 2 Va. App. -, 2 V.L.R. 1211 (Because
wife's physical problem was due to anxiety about divorce, and not her husband's behavior,
her departure constituted fault ground of desertion, rather than justified departure.).
38. Breschel, 221 Va. at 212-13, 269 S.E.2d at 366.
39. The newly created Court of Appeals of Virginia became effective on January 1, 1985,
and decided its first case on August 6, 1985. Because the appeal of domestic relations cases
to that court is a matter of right, VA. CODE ANN. § 17-116.05(3) (Cum. Supp. 1985), it is
anticipated that this new court will significantly increase the number of written appellate
opinions in those cases. A decision in the court of appeals in a domestic relations case is
subject to review by the Virginia Supreme Court if the case involves "a substantial constitu-
tional question . .. or matters of significant predecential value." VA. CODE ANN. § 17-
116.07(B) (Cum. Supp. 1985).
40. 2 Va. App. -, 2 V.L.R. 935 (1986).
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band's part, yet is sufficient to cause the wife to reasonably believe
that her health or well being is endangered by remaining in the
household, and, prior to her departure she has unsuccessfully taken
whatever measures might be expected to eliminate the concern, then
her departure is justified. In such cases the wife is not guilty of de-
sertion because her intent is not to abandon her husband, but rather
to shield herself from the cause of such concern.4'
Noting that each such departure must be judged by the trial court
on the facts of the case then before it,42 the court upheld the trial
court's finding in Brawand that the wife was justified in leaving43 a
"failed marriage.'44
Now that the courts have abandoned the requirement that
grounds for divorce be established as justification for breaking off
cohabitation, it appears that perhaps even incompatibility could
constitute justification for a spouse to leave the home and still ob-
tain a spousal support award.4 5 Thus, in order to demonstrate jus-
tification, the departing spouse must resort to presenting a case
that casts the marriage in the worst possible light in order to con-
vince the court that the parties were better off by separating and
that the marriage was irretrievably broken.46
B. The Alls 47 or Plattner4s Rule
The risk of failing to convince the court that leaving the home
was justified, thereby raising desertions as a bar to spousal sup-
port, can be avoided if the spouse who plans to leave is aware of
the law in Virginia with regard to filing suit prior to separation.
The Alls or Plattner rule provides that a spouse is not guilty of
legal desertion if he or she leaves the other spouse after the institu-
41. Id. at -, 2 V.L.R. at 940-41.
42. Id. at -, 2 V.L.R. at 941.
43. Id.
44. Id. at -, 2 V.L.R. at 936.
45. The possibility that incompatibility could constitute justification for desertion is the
practical effect of the courts' efforts to reach equitable results regarding spousal support in
these types of cases. The law of Virginia, however, is still that a fault divorce cannot be
granted merely because a husband and wife are unable to live in peace and harmony. Coe v.
Coe, 225 Va. 616, 303 S.E.2d 923 (1983).
46. But see Rexrode v. Rexrode, 2 Va. App. -, 2 V.L.R. 1143 (1986) (husband's extreme
rudeness towards wife and her relatives did not entitle wife to divorce on ground of cruelty,
nor did it justify her departure from marital home; wife found guilty of desertion).
47. Alls v. Alls, 216 Va. 13, 216 S.E.2d 16 (1975).
48. Plattner v. Plattner, 202 Va. 263, 117 S.E.2d 128 (1960).
[Vol. 20:295
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tion of a suit for divorce or durjng its pendency.49 Therefore, if a
wife wants to avoid a charge of desertion, she can file suit alleging
some divorce ground, usually cruelty, prior to leaving the marital
home. Thereafter, even on the same day, she may leave the marital
home and then later have process served upon her husband; he will
not know that he has been sued until she is gone.50 She is not re-
quired to prove or even offer any evidence of the alleged grounds
in order to justify her departure.51 Of course, such planning may
49. Alls, 216 Va. at 14, 216 S.E.2d at 17; Plattner, 202 Va. at 266, 117 S.E.2d at 130; see
also Painter v. Painter, 215 Va. 418, 421, 211 S.E.2d 37, 39 (1975); Hudgins v. Hudgins, 181
Va. 81, 87, 23 S.E.2d 774, 777 (1943); Craig v. Craig, 118 Va. 284, 292, 87 S.E. 727, 730
(1916).
50. See Johnson v. Johnson, 213 Va. 204, 209, 191 S.E.2d 206, 210 (1972). In Johnson, the
court said, "we attach no significance to the fact that [the wife] timed her trip so as to be
absent from [her] home on the day process was served on [the husband]. Manifestly this
was done to avoid what could have been another unpleasant and violent episode in the lives
of the parties." Id.
51. The Virginia Supreme Court's view of the bad faith filing of suit for divorce under
such circumstances has been expressed in dicta. In Roberts v. Roberts, 223 Va. 736, 292
S.E.2d 370 (1982), the court was confronted with this issue:
Conceding that the law is settled on this point, [the husband] argues that some ex-
ceptions should be made to this rule in cases where the party filing the original suit
continues to live in the marital abode for a long period of time, or where the original
suit turns out to be frivolous, a mere sham created in order to permit the complain-
ant to desert the defendant with impunity. [The husband] asks us to consider author-
ities from other jurisdictions in which similar limitations have been adopted. He ar-
gues that an excessively rigid application of the Alls rule would permit a wife who
wishes to desert her husband, but also wishes to claim spousal support from him to
institute a frivolous suit against him, based on charges for which she has no evidence,
and thereafter to desert him. She could later amend her suit to claim a divorce on the
ground of one year's separation, but he would be barred from asserting her desertion
as a defense to her claim for spousal support.
223 Va. at 740-41, 292 S.E.2d at 372.
The court found, however, that the wife's bill of complaint was not frivolous. It found the
case especially inappropriate for creating an exception to Alls because the husband himself
had filed a cross-bill of complaint charging the wife with desertion at the time she moved
out of the home. Leaving the home upon being sued for divorce always is considered justi-
fied. Id. at 741, 292 S.E.2d at 372. The court, while not creating an exception, did observe:
"We recognize the force of this argument. Equitable rules should not be so inflexibly applied
as to shield fraud or oppression. We do not, however, view this as a case in which the equi-
ties demand the creation of an exception to the Alls rule." Id. at 740-41, 292 S.E.2d at 373.
In Vardell v. Vardell, 225 Va. 351, 302 S.E.2d 41 (1983), the husband sought divorce from
the wife for constructive desertion. She had had him evicted from the marital home pursu-
ant to an injunction order entered ex parte. The court found no validity in his argument
because "[i]n granting the initial injunction and subsequently extending its term, the trial
court implicitly decided that the wife presented facts sufficient to demonstrate a reasonable
likelihood that her health and safety would be endangered if the parties remained in the
home together." 225 Va. at 354, 302 S.E.2d at 42. The injunction standing alone could not
substitute for the wife actually proving the cuelty she alleged in her divorce complaint. But
she had not acted in bad faith, nor had she constructively deserted her husband.
However, in a concurring opinion, Justice Russell observed:
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not offer a practical solution to a spouse whose personal safety is
jeopardized and who does not have time or resources to file a di-
vorce suit before leaving the dangerous home.
C. Adultery
The apparent judicial concern over fault as a bar to spousal sup-
port has also created some perplexing decisions in divorce suits in
which adultery is alleged. For example, the standard of proof re-
quired to prove adultery as a fault grounds barring spousal support
appears to be greater than a preponderance of the evidence, as one
dissenting justice has suggested.52 The burden of proof is even
greater than that which would be required to convict in a criminal
adultery case.53 Even where the evidence of adultery may be suffi-
cient, procedural defects may be found to avoid a harsh result.54
I think it worthy of note, however, that if the wife's claim for injunction had not been
so fortified, a different result might obtain. It is hard to imagine a more drastic and
complete withdrawal from the marital relationship than obtaining, without good
cause, an ex parte injunction which evicts one's spouse from the marital home. An ex
parte showing of equity would, in my view, be insufficient to shield the complaining
spouse from a charge of constructive desertion, where such an eviction later proves to
have been unfounded.
Id. at 356, 302 S.E.2d at 43 (Russell, J., concurring).
52. See Dooley v. Dooley, 222 Va. 240, 278 S.E.2d 865 (1981). The strict evidence stan-
dards for proof of adultery established by the majority opinion prompted this comment
from Justice Poff in his dissent:
When we review criminal convictions, we consistently apply the rules that circum-
stantial evidence may be sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; that all
conflicts in the evidence are resolved by the fact-finder; that the evidence and the
reasonable inferences it raises are viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing
party; and that the trial court's judgment is presumed to be correct and is not to be
disturbed unless plainly wrong. Presumably, we would apply these rules reviewing a
conviction for the crime of adultery. By what curious logic do we ignore them when
we review findings of fact based upon conflicting evidence of adultery in a civil case
where the standard of proof is lower?
Id. at 247, 278 S.E.2d at 869 (Poff, J., dissenting).
53. See id.
54. See Roberts v. Roberts, 223 Va. 736, 292 S.E.2d 370 (1982). In this case, the court
deftly avoided the inequitable result in an interesting factual and procedural situation. The
commissioner had announced from the bench a final decision awarding the wife a divorce
and spousal support. The wife allegedly committed adultery after the decision, but before
the attorneys could agree on a draft of a final decree to present to the commissioner for
entry. The husband then charged her with adultery. Apparently, had he been allowed to
proceed with the adultery claim, the wife would have lost the spousal support already
awarded to her, but not yet formally reduced to writing. However, the supreme court af-
firmed the trial court's denial of the husband's motion to file an amended bill alleging adul-
tery because he had filed the motion three days before the first act of adultery allegedly
occurred:
The court was free to conclude that [the husband's] motion was made in good faith,
1986] FAULT IN VIRGINIA DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS
Such a harsh result was avoided in Wallace v. Wallace,5s a re-
cent decision by the Virginia Court of Appeals, which involved the
issue of whether post-separation adultery would bar the wife's
spousal support claim. Because the husband had first been guilty
of adultery and desertion that caused the separation, the court in
Wallace stated that he had come into equity with unclean hands;
he was therefore precluded from establishing that the wife had
subsequently committed adultery, which would have barred her
claim for spousal support.56
but was merely an effort to avoid the spousal support previously awarded, in the hope
that evidence of adultery might later be found. In these circumstances we can not say
that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the husband's motion.
Id. at 742, 292 S.E.2d at 373.
55. Wallace v. Wallace, 1 Va. App. 183, 336 S.E.2d 27 (1985). The facts of this case cer-
tainly commanded some judicial gymnastics to save the wife's support claim. The parties
had been separated fifteen years since the husband had abandoned the family, during which
time he had been paying child and spousal support pursuant to a juvenile court order. Also
during this time, the husband had been living with another woman. The wife's alleged adul-
tery occurred after the fifteen-year separation and following the institution of divorce
proceedings.
56. Because Virginia is one of the few remaining states in which adultery is a criminal
offense, Mrs. Wallace was entitled to assert her fifth amendment privilege against self-in-
crimination when asked if she had committed adultery. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-365 (Repl.
Vol. 1982). However, such criminal offenders are seldom prosecuted. Roe v. Roe, 228 Va.
722, 727-28, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (1985).
The court has traditionally used two methods to approach this constitutional claim. One
method is to allow the assertion of the privilege, which protects the party's right against
self-incrimination in a separate criminal proceeding; then, the court makes a finding of fact
in the civil divorce proceeding, drawing an inference from the assertion of the privilege that
the party has committed adultery. This inference is based on the fact that if the truthful
answer to the question were in the negative, the party would have so stated.
The other method of dealing with the assertion of the privilege is the "sword and shield
doctrine." As applied, this equity principle means that a party may not seek the sword of
relief in equity and at the same time use the fifth amendment privilege as a shield to protect
himself from inquiries that may be pertinent to awarding appropriate relief. For example, if
a party is seeking spousal support, he or she must allow the court to make a finding as to
the existence of fault which may potentially bar his or her entitlement to such support. A
more glaring example would arise in a custody case. If a party wants the court to consider
awarding custody of a child to him or her, that party must be willing to let the court inquire
into fitness, which may include inquiry into the area of morality.
In Wallace, the district court refused to use the sword and shield doctrine against Mrs.
Wallace because Mr. Wallace himself had caused the disintegration of the marriage; there-
fore, he had not come into equity with clean hands. 1 Va. App. at 185, 336 S.E.2d at 28. On
the facts in that case, it does not appear that this brought about an inequitable result. In
1985, however the Virginia General Assembly enacted VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-223.1 (Cum.
Supp. 1985), which provides: "In any civil action the exercise by a party of any constitu-
tional protection shall not be used against him." This provision apparently means that a
court can neither draw an inference from the assertion of the fifth amendment privilege nor
use the sword and shield doctrine against the party invoking it. Since a party's right against
self-incrimination in a criminal case can be preserved by its assertion, no useful purpose can
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While reaching what was unquestionably a just result, the court
never squarely confronted the plain wording of Virginia Code sec-
tion 20-107.1, which does not merely bar spousal support for "fault
causing the separation ' 5 7 or "misconduct entitling the husband to
a divorce."5 8 Rather, the statute provides that no support is to be
awarded where a ground of divorce "exists. ' 59 Thus, a simple read-
be served by allowing a party to assert that privilege in a civil proceeding with impunity. A
court should, in appropriate circumstances, particularly in custody cases, be given the power
to draw inferences or invoke the sword and shield doctrine. It seems that the only result to
be achieved by the new statute is to protect an adulterous spouse in a divorce proceeding. It
would better serve the ends of justice if the private matter of adultery were left to divorce
proceedings and removed from the criminal law.
In Boswell v. Boswell, 209 Va. 819, 166 S.E.2d 927 (1969), the Virginia Supreme Court
confronted the question whether a wife forfeited her right to spousal support where she had
been adjudged guilty of desertion, but the husband was found to be guilty of subsequent
acts of adultery. The trial court had held that she was barred from spousal support because
of the existence of fault. The wife argued on brief, inter alia, that this was a case of recrimi-
nation because the grounds for divorce against her husband were more serious than those
against her. The wife relied upon VA. CODE ANN. § 20-117 (Repl. Vol. 1983) (divorce from
bond of matrimony after divorce from bed and board), arguing that the court should con-
sider the relative degree of the parties' misconduct when deciding whether to award ali-
mony. See Brief for Appellant at 10, Boswell v. Boswell, 209 Va. 819, 166 S.E.2d 927 (1969).
Because the supreme court was equally divided on the issue on appeal, the decree of the
lower court was affirmed without opinion. 209 Va. 819, 166 S.E.2d 927.
57. Blevins v. Blevins, 225 Va. 18, 21, 300 S.E.2d 743, 745 (1983) (court referred to "fault
causing separation" rather than "existence of fault grounds"); Brooker v. Brooker, 218 Va.
12, 13, 235 S.E.2d 309, 310 (1977) (same).
58. Thomas v. Thomas, 217 Va. 502, 504, 229 S.E.2d 887, 889 (1976) (court referred to
"misconduct entitling [husband] to divorce" rather than "existence of fault grounds").
59. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1 (Cum. Supp. 1985) (emphasis added). Earlier cases had al-
lowed the introduction of adultery grounds that arose after separation and even after the
filing of suit for divorce. The supreme court had reasoned that introduction of such grounds
was consistent with the policy of the legislature that the waiting period between the separa-
tion and final decree "is designed primarily to give the parties an opportunity to reconcile
and to determine if they desire the separation to be final. The commission of adultery dur-
ing that period by either party to a marriage in trouble is the one act most likely to frustrate
and prevent a reconciliation." Coe v. Coe, 225 Va. 616, 620, 303 S.E.2d 923, 925-26 (1983)
(alleged adultery committed nine months after separation but prior to any testimony being
taken in the case); see also Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 210 Va. 44, 168 S.E.2d 251 (1969) (al-
leged adultery committed after original complaint filed).
In Roberts v. Roberts, 223 Va. 736, 292 S.E.2d 370 (1982), had the husband sought to
properly file his amended pleading in good faith, the court might even have allowed the
introduction of evidence of adultery, allegedly committed after its final ruling but before the
decree itself was formally entered. See supra note 54.
Further, it is not necessary that a divorce be awarded on fault grounds to bar the right to
spousal support. Brooker v. Brooker, 218 Va. 12, 13, 235 S.E.2d 309, 310 (1977) (husband
would not be obligated to support wife after no-fault divorce if separation caused by wife's
misconduct of constituting fault grounds).
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-99 (Cum. Supp. 1985) sets out the burden of proof requirement neces-
sary to establish the existence of grounds for divorce. It provides that a divorce shall not be
granted on the uncorroborated testimony of either or both parties. This statutory require-
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ing of the statute would require the denial of spousal support
whenever a fault ground exists against the dependent spouse, even
if the divorce was awarded under the no-fault provisions.
This uncertainty in the statute could be removed by a clear ex-
pression of intent by the legislature. However, the Virginia General
Assembly must first decide if the public policy in Virginia is to
terminate the spousal support rights of a spouse who, though fault-
less in destroying the marriage, has not remained celibate during
the separation while awaiting the entry of a divorce decree.6
II. FAULT AS A FACTOR IN EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
When section 20-107.311 was enacted in 1982, Virginia joined the
mainstream of jurisdictions which have adopted equitable distribu-
tion of marital property as an integral part of their divorce law.6 2
ment is not intended as a standard of proof in a divorce case, but rather to prevent divorces
by collusion. Forbes v. Forbes, 182 Va. 636, 640, 29 S.E.2d 829, 831 (1944). Where it is
apparent that there is no collusion, the corroboration need only be slight. Martin v. Martin,
202 Va. 769, 774, 120 S.E.2d 471, 474 (1961); Graves v. Graves, 193 Va. 659, 662-63, 70
S.E.2d 339, 340 (1952).
Thus, it would seem that little or no corroboration is necessary to prove the existence of
fault barring spousal support where divorce is not sought on those grounds. For example, if
a party were to admit to committing adultery, that admission alone would be sufficient to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that fault exists even though the corroboration
necessary to obtain a divorce on those grounds may be lacking. This is consistent with the
approach taken by the Virginia Supreme Court in Graham v. Graham, 210 Va. 608, 610, 172
S.E.2d 724, 726 (1978), where it was held that the admissions of a party alone and without
corroboration are admissible and competent as evidence to defeat a prayer for divorce.
60. In the 1986 session of the Virginia General Assembly, Senate Bill 11 was passed by
the Senate, but was passed by indefinitely by the House of Delegates Courts of Justice Com-
mittee. This bill proposed retention of only adultery as a bar to spousal support. Other fault
grounds would be considered as factors in determining support and maintenance for a
spouse under VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1 (Repl. Vol. 1983). To the factors the court considers
in awarding spousal support, the bill would have added: "Sa. The circumstances and factors
which contributed to the dissolution of the marriage, specifically including any ground for
divorce under the provisions of § 20-91(1), (3) or (6) or § 20-95 .... .
Had this bill been enacted, the issue of post-separation adultery as a bar to spousal sup-
port would have remained, and the problem word "exists" would have been retained. For a
discussion of Virginia legislators' views on the bill, see Richmond Times Dispatch, Feb. 21,
1986, at A6, col. 4.
61. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (Cum. Supp. 1985).
62. "Section 20-107.3 brings the Commonwealth into the mainstream of a 'broad reform
movement in this country to vest substantially greater descretion [sic] in the courts to reach
equitable results than that which existed under the common law title system."' REPORT OF
THE JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE STUDYING SECTION 20-107 OF THE CODE OF VIRGINIA TO THE GOVER-
NOR AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, H. Doc. No. 21, at 7 (1982) (quoting Auerbach
& Jenner, Historical and Practical Notes to ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503 (Smith-Hurd
1980)) [hereinafter cited as JOINT SuBcommrrrEr REPORT].
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The basic philosophy underlying equitable distribution is that
marriage is an economic partnership, and consequently upon di-
vorce each spouse should receive a fair share of what was accumu-
lated during the marriage.6 3
The Virginia statute sets forth a scheme for identifying and dis-
tributing marital property.6 4 In determining the division of marital
property, the court is directed to consider eleven statutory fac-
tors. 5 Perhaps as a reflection of Virginia's basically conservative
approach towards divorce,6 6 the legislature specifically included
marital fault as one of those factors. The statute directs the court
to consider the circumstances and factors which contributed to the
dissolution of the marriage, specifically including any ground for
divorce.6 7
63. JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 62, at 7; see, e.g., Blickstein v. Blickstein, 99
A.D.2d 287, 472 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1984).
64. Virginia is one of only two states that does not vest the court with the power to di-
rectly order the distribution of property. The court must instead make a monetary award
based upon the inequitable ownership of marital property. See MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. §
8-205 (1984); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(C), (D) (Cum. Supp. 1985).
The court begins by determining which property is marital property and the ownership
thereof. After ownership, classification and values have been established, the court is di-
rected to consider eleven enumerated factors to determine a fair distribution.
For a guide to the practical usage and application of Virginia Code § 20-107.3, see
Marchant, Virginia's Equitable Distribution Statute: What Does It Really Mean and
Where Do I Start?, VA. B.A.J. 10 (Spring 1985).
65. 1. The contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of
the family;
2. The contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party in the acquisition and
care and maintenance of such marital property of the parties;
3. The duration of the marriage;
4. The ages and physical and mental condition of the parties;
5. The circumstances and factors which contributed to the dissolution of the marriage,
specifically including any ground for divorce under the provisions of § 20-91 (1), (3)
or (6) or § 20-95;
6. How and when specific items of such marital property were acquired;
7. The debts and liabilities of each spouse, the basis for such debts and liabilities, and the
property which may serve as security for such debts and liabilities;
8. The present value of pension or retirement benefits, whether vested or nonvested;
9. The liquid or nonliquid character of all marital property;
10. The tax consequences to each party; and
11. Such other factors as the court deems necessary or appropriate to consider in order to
arrive at a fair and equitable monetary award.
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(E) (Cum. Supp. 1985).
66. "The trend is to minimize the importance of marital fault as a factor in litigation."
Freed & Walker, supra note 1, at 394.
67. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(E)(5) (Cure. Supp. 1985). Arguably, misconduct that occurs
after the parties' separation cannot be considered the cause of marital breakdown and
should not affect the distribution of marital assets.
The joint subcommittee created to study § 20-107 recommended the inclusion of fault:
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Virginia's approach to including fault as a factor differs from
that used in many other states. In some states, marital fault is not
specifically listed as a factor as it is in Virginia, but instead may be
considered under the "wild card" or "catchall" factor, which em-
powers the court to consider any other factor which it deems ap-
propriate to reach a fair result."8 In some of those states and in
some states whose statutes contain neither a "catchall" factor nor
any reference to fault, there are only limited circumstances in
which fault can affect equitable distribution. e In several other
The members, after lengthy discussion, decided that to allow fault to serve as an
absolute bar to the monetary award would defeat the equitable purpose of this sec-
tion. However, to avoid unreasonable results in situations involving fault, the circum-.
stances contributing to the dissolution of the marriage, specifically including any
ground for divorce, have been included among the factors for consideration in the
court.
JOINT SUBcOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 62, at 8.
68. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(E)(11) (Cum. Supp. 1985) ("[sluch other factors as
the court deems necessary or appropriate to consider in order to arrive at a fair and equita-
ble monetary award"); see also Reich v. Reich, 235 Kan. 339, -, 680 P.2d 545, 547 (1984)
(under equitable distribution statute which has catchall factor but is silent as to fault, mari-
tal fault may be considered). But see In re Marriage of Willcoxson, 250 N.W.2d 425 (Iowa
1977) (under statute which contains catchall factor, fault no longer relevant to equitable
distribution). In New York, relevance of fault to equitable distribution is not settled. Com-
pare Giannola v. Giannola, 109 Misc. 2d 985, 441 N.Y.S.2d 341 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term. 1981)
(statute contains catchall factor under which marital fault may be considered) with M.V.R.
v. T.M.R., 115 Misc. 2d 674, 454 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. 1982) (fault is irrelevant, difficult to
determine, and as a matter of law may not be considered).
The equitable distribution statutes of many states do not have a catchall factor and are
silent as to marital fault. The courts of several of these states have held marital fault to be a
relevant consideration. See, e.g., Ross v. Ross, 103 Idaho 406, 648 P.2d 1119 (1982) (marital
fault may be considered); Ripley v. Ripley, 112 Mich. App. 219, 315 N.W.2d 576 (1982)
(cause of divorce may be considered); Ebbert v. Ebbert, 123 N.H. 252, 459 A.2d 282 (1983)
(evidence of fault admissible when fault grounds pleaded); Rust v. Rust, 321 N.W.2d 504
(N.D. 1982) (marital fault relevant to equitable distribution); see also infra note 69.
69. In some states, where the equitable distribution statutes contain a catchall factor,
fault may be considered only in limited circumstances, such as one spouse's outrageous be-
havior. See, e.g., Blickstein v. Blickstein, 99 A.D.2d 287, -, 472 N.Y.S.2d 110, 113-14
(1984) (although as general rule marital fault not relevant to equitable distribution, it might
be one pertinent factor in cases involving conduct which "shocks the conscience"). Such
limited consideration of fault is also permitted in states with neither a catchall factor nor
statutory mention of marital fault. See D'Arc v. D'Arc, 164 N.J. Super. 226, 395 A.2d 1270
(Ch. Div. 1978) (husband's evil and outrageous behavior in attempting to arrange wife's
murder considered), modified on other grounds, 175 N.J. Super. 598, 421 A.2d 603 (App.
Div. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981).
The statutes of sixteen states require consideration of economic fault, such as the dissipa-
tion or secreting of marital assets by one spouse. See Freed & Walker, supra note 1, at 394-
95. Economic misconduct has also been held to be relevant in other states without such
statutory directive. See, e.g., Blickstein, 99 A.D.2d 287, 472 N.Y.S.2d 110 (court may con-
sider marital misconduct that "shocks the conscience" and, as a general rule, economic fault
as well); Smith v. Smith, 314 N.C. 80, 331 S.E.2d 682 (1985) (court may consider economic
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states, fault is not a factor to be considered at all.70
In states in which fault is not a permissible factor for the courts
to consider, the underlying rationale is that equitable distribution
involves the dissolution of an economic partnership. 71 As such,
fault or misconduct which is not related to the economic conditions
of the partnership should not be a factor in dividing up its assets. 2
Rather, the court should confine itself to consideration of such fac-
tors as economic contributions to the marriage, contributions to
the family's well-being, and the overall economic conditions of the
partnership and of each party.73
In jurisdictions that include fault as a factor, one commentator
has postulated that such inclusion is based on the belief of legisla-
tors and judges that a "bad" person should not be rewarded.74
However, consideration of fault in property distribution also may
be based on sound and traditional principles of contract. Where
two parties enter into a marriage contract to last until the death of
either party and one party breaches that contract by an earlier ter-
mination of the marriage, general contract principles dictate that
the breaching party bear the economic loss. Of course, divorce law
is not pure contract law, but neither is it purely the law of
partnership.
The precise role which fault is to play in equitable distribution is
difficult to determine. Fault does not lend itself to ready calcula-
tion to the same degree as some economic factors.75 In Virginia, as
fault, but not marital fault unless it is related to the economic condition of the marriage).
70. Consideration of marital fault in equitable distribution is specifically precluded by the
statutes of Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota,
Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, West
Virginia, Wisconsin and the Virgin Islands. Fault as a Factor in Equitable Distribution, 1
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION J. 57, 58-59 (1984); Freed & Walker, supra note 1, at 393-402.
The courts in some states whose statutes are silent as to whether fault is a permissible
factor have held that marital fault is irrelevant to the division of marital assets. See, e.g.,
Boyd v. Boyd, 421 A.2d 1356 (Me. 1980) (fault should not normally be considered, especially
when divorce granted on no-fault ground); Campbell v. Campbell, 202 Neb. 575, 276 N.W.2d
220 (1979) (noting that no case has held that the grant, denial, or reduction of alimony or
the division of property should be punitive); Chalmers v. Chalmers, 65 N.J. 186, 320 A.2d
478 (1974) (focus on marital fault would be incompatible with basic philosophy underlying
equitable distribution).
71. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 314 N.C. 80, 331 S.E.2d 682 (1985).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. J. GOLDEN, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY 255 (1983).
75. It would certainly be easier to quantify debts and liabilities of each spouse, or perhaps
the value of a pension plan, than to place a monetary value on one spouse's adulterous
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of this writing, there are no reported appellate cases which give
any guidance to the trial courts in determining the weight to be
given the fault factor.
In fact, no specific weight should be assigned to fault as a statu-
tory factor. Even if one party is legally at fault in bringing about
the termination of the marriage, many other circumstances leading
up to that final separation may have contributed to it; the blame
for those circumstances may be laid at the feet of the other party
or both of them.76 As one court noted, "fault may be merely a
manifestation of a sick marriage. The spouse [whose conduct pro-
vides] .. .grounds for divorce may not be responsible for the
breakdown of the marriage and may merely be reacting to a situa-
tion which is not of his or her making."'7 In such a case, the court
may find that fault, in the sense of the final act of misconduct con-
stituting the grounds for divorce, should be given no weight. Per-
haps it should be offset by a consideration of earlier instances of
misconduct in the marriage which the party presently at fault may
have forgiven or endured.78 Thus, the uncertain role assigned to
fault under the Virginia equitable distribution statute actually may
benefit the parties and the courts by providing maximal flexibility
in reaching a truly equitable property distribution.
III. RECOMMENDED ROLE OF FAULT UNDER VIRGINIA DIVORCE LAW
In Virginia at least, fault will likely be a part of divorce jurispru-
dence for some time to come, and perhaps it does have its place. In
determining issues of custody, support, or property division, and in
trying to reach an equitable result, certainly there are circum-
stances where fault should be considered to some degree.
In order to achieve an equitable distribution of the marital as-
sets, it seems unrealistic to totally ignore fault as a factor as some
states do. The Virginia approach seems preferable as long as the
fault factor is not used to clobber the wrongdoer. When the court
can consider all of the facts and circumstances which contributed
to the dissolution of the marriage in combination with the other
statutory factors, it can fashion a more equitable division of the
conduct. See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(E) (Cum. Supp. 1985).
76. See, e.g., Chalmers v. Chalmers, 65 N.J. 186, _, 320 A.2d 478, 482 (1974).
77. Id.
78. Such an offset rould achieve equitable results in a case with a factual situation similar
to Roberts v. Roberts, 223 Va. 736, 292 S.E.2d 370 (1982). See supra note 54.
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marital assets. Otherwise, "equitable" distribution is a misnomer,
and the division would be better left to appraisers and accountants
instead of lawyers and judges.
However, fault seems to play too great a role in Virginia's di-
vorce law. The rule that creates an absolute bar to spousal support
serves only to deprive the court of sufficient discretion to reach an
equitable result in a divorce case. Faced with having to apply such
a rigid rule, it is inevitable that the court will look for a way
around the rule, as it has, even if that means resorting to an artifi-
cial interpretation of the statute's plain wording to render a fair
meaning and application in a particular case. However, it is the
legislature, and not the courts, that 9hould address this issue as a
matter of public policy.
Rather than having an inflexible rule under which the existence
of grounds for divorce is an absolute bar to spousal support, the
Virginia General Assembly could borrow from language in the eq-
uitable distribution statute 9 to amend the spousal support provi-
sions to provide: "The amount of spousal support to be awarded, if
any, shall also be determined by the circumstances and factors
which contributed to the dissolution of the marriage, specifically
including any ground for divorce under any provision of § 20-91(1),
(3) or (6) or § 20-95." With such discretion, the court could still
find under certain circumstances that the conduct of the depen-
dent spouse was such that he or she should receive no support
from the other. However, where, for example, the economically de-
pendent spouse has been good and dutiful for many years of mar-
riage and may have endured and forgiven many acts of misconduct
on the part of his or her spouse over the years, the dependent
spouse should not be absolutely barred from spousal support sim-
ply because he or she was guilty of the last transgression. It seems
unnecessarily restrictive and rigid to take away from the court its
discretion to consider all of the circumstances in making this
determination.
Given the modern state of the marriage institution, the legisla-
ture also should consider whether having archaic grounds for di-
vorce serves any beneficial purpose. Although the court should
maintain the policy of considering and giving appropriate weight
to the circumstances and factors contributing to the dissolution of
the marriage when it makes determinations regarding custody,
79. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (Cum. Supp. 1985).
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support, and property division, it is not necessary for the divorce
decree itself to be a scarlet letter on the forehead of the wrongdoer.
Virginia presently has a statute which provides for a no-fault di-
vorce after a six-month period of separation when the parties have
no minor children and have entered into a property settlement
agreement.80 The legislature should consider treating all married
couples equally by removing those qualifications for a six-month
divorce. This shortened separation period would eliminate collu-
sive divorce suits brought on the grounds of adultery and initiated
because the parties want to obtain a divorce without having to wait
for a year of separation. Further, the required six-month period of
separation would afford all marriages a cooling-off period, regard-
less of the circumstances that brought about the separation.
Any change in the divorce law should not be made merely for
the purpose of putting Virginia into the mainstream. Rather, it
should be made to empower the courts to consider each case on its
individual facts and circumstances without being bound by inflexi-
ble and archaic rules.
80. Id. § 20-91(9)(a) (Repl. Vol. 1982). The required separation period for other couples is
one year. Id.
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